THAT FOREIGN POWER WAS AND STILL IS MALAYA.
But following the digestion of further explanations from Tunku, who paid brief visits to Sarawak in July-August 1961, those who initially were skeptical or had reservations were won over. Moreover, urged by Mustapha, Tunku invited leaders from Sarawak and North Borneo to visit Malaya on a fact-finding mission.
This was all part of the con-game, but Sarawakian leaders and most Sarawakians themselves didn't realize it then.
The Borneo visitors were awed by Kuala Lumpur and were especially impressed with the Malayan Government’s achievements in rural development. Many returned convinced that entry into Malaysia was a good idea. Meanwhile, Waddell had sent local Sarawak leaders (members of Council Negri) to participate in the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Conference in Singapore in July 1961. At this forum the Sarawak leaders had the opportunity to discuss the Malaysia proposal face-to-face with their Malayan and Singaporean counterparts.
Little did they realize that Malaya had then reached the limit of its economic resources and required a new pool of resources upon which to further develop itself, and which was to be provided by Sarawak and Sabah at their own expense and to their own detriment.
It was here that Sarawak leaders began to emphasize the need for conditions in the form of safeguards to protect the rights and interests of the peoples of Sarawak. Consequently, it dawned on the Sarawak leaders that they were directly involved in the deliberation of the fate of the territory – Sarawak – that they had long called their home. This awakening of political consciousness was further developed in the follow-up discussions at the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee which held meetings between August 1961 and February 1962.
One of the main safeguards which they forgot was to keep their petroleum resources for themselves. The Malayans were glad to be silent on this, since they knew that under international law, offshore petroleum resources belonged to the federal government.
The growth of political awareness among the leaders of Sarawak accelerated the formation of political parties and the development of party politics. Prior to the Tunku’s announcement in May 1961, only two political parties existed: the Sarawak United People’s Party (SUPP) established in June 1959, and Party Negara Sarawak (Panas) in April 1960.
By the time local council elections were held in June 1963, four more parties were established, namely Sarawak National Party (SNAP, April 1961), Barisan Rakyat Jati Sarawak (Barjasa, December 1961), Sarawak Chinese Association (SCA, July 1962), and Party Pesaka Anak Sarawak (Pesaka, August 1962).
The political parties, despite claims by some to be multi-ethnic, were established on communal and geographical lines. All political parties adopted a pro-Malaysia stance except SUPP, which preferred self-government, Borneo Federation, and only then Malaysia.
And so, the political parties took the pros and cons of the Malaysia proposal to the kampungs and longhouses.
The Malay-Muslim communities (Malays and Muslim Melanaus) although split into two camps – Panas led by the traditional Kuching elite and Barjasa by the intelligentsia of the Sibu area – in general supported Malaysia. However, Malay-Muslim groups in Miri, Limbang and Lawas, together with the Kedayans, rejected Malaysia; instead they shared Azahari’s and the PRB’s aspirations.
Traditional Iban leaders of the Rejang led by Jugah (Pesaka’s leader) were partial to Malaysia.
Stephen Kalong Ningkan and his better-educated colleagues from Simanggang and the Saribas area stressed safeguards and conditions in considering Malaysia.
The Kayans and Kenyahs opposed Malaysia. They were apprehensive of being dominated by their traditional enemies, the Ibans.
The Chinese in SUPP that were influenced by Leftist elements forcefully rejected the Malaysia proposal as a neo-colonial scheme designed to perpetuate British hegemony in South-East Asia. Malay, Iban and Bidayuh members of SUPP also towed the party line.
In reality it was a scheme cooked up by the Malayans to replace British hegemony with Malayan hegemony.
The SCA was a refuge for those Chinese who thought Malaysia was advantageous to Sarawak’s economy. But among the large majority of Sarawak’s multi-ethnic inhabitants, in particular those in the rural districts, there was little understanding of the Malaysia proposal and its implications.
This being the case, could there be any real acceptance by the majority of Sarawakians?
Credits: Borneo Wiki
0 comments :
Post a Comment